Purpose: The main purpose of this research is to test the relationship between family firms and remuneration of the board of directors under the influence of political relations in the Tehran Stock Exchange. Since the ownership structure of the family is a decision-making structure, the expectation of earning profit and increasing wealth is not a priority. If members of the family are elected as members of the board, the company's performance is better than that of non-family members of the board of directors because they receive less rewards and less responsive to motivational plans and are more likely to create value in the company.
Methodology: In this research, the effect of political relationships on the relationship between family firms and remuneration of the board of directors is examined for a sample of 90 companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period from 2011 to 1396. The statistical method used to test the research hypotheses is the method of panel data (data panel).
Results: The results of the statistical analysis of the research hypotheses show that there is a significant relationship between family firms and board remuneration according to previous research. Institutional ownership and more of the stock of family members in the company have a significant impact on the relationship. Finally, the research results indicate that political communication has a significant impact on the relationship between family firms and remuneration of the board of directors