In this research, the effect of the characteristics of the board of directors on the change of profit classification has been investigated. The scope of the research was the companies accepted in the Tehran Stock Exchange. To measure the change in profit classification, the method of Thaghafi et al. (2017) was used, and to measure the characteristics of the board of directors, the size of the board of directors, the number of board meetings, the independence of the board of directors, and the gender diversity of the board of directors were used. Finally, using the information of 213 companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange during a 9-year period from 2013 to 2014 and a total of 1917 observations (company-years), the hypotheses have been tested. Also, econometric techniques and Eviuse software have been used to test the hypotheses. The findings of this study showed that the size of the board of directors, the number of board meetings, the independence of the board of directors, and the gender diversity of the board of directors have a significant effect on the change of profit classification. Based on the findings of the study, it can be seen that this study used agency theory to justify the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and classification change. The issue of information asymmetry is related to the manager-agent relationship, which can provide an opportunity for managers (agents) to pursue their own interests instead of the interests of their investors (managers).