Considering the importance of agency fees, conflict of interest and the requirements of international financial reporting standards; This research examines the impact of international financial reporting standards and financial distress on the relationship between information asymmetry and agency costs in Tehran Stock Exchange using the information of 103 companies in the period from 1394 to 1401. For this purpose, the research was divided into two periods including 1394 to 1397, i.e. before the implementation of international financial reporting standards, and after that, i.e. 1398 to 1401, then in order to estimate the research model, the generalized least squares regression method with a panel approach was used. The results of the research showed that there is a positive and significant relationship between information asymmetry and agency cost, and when information asymmetry increases, the amount and intensity of agency cost also increases, but the intensity of this relationship in the conditions before and after the implementation of the standards between international financial reporting standards are different, and in the conditions after these standards become mandatory, the intensity of this relationship is moderated and reduced, which indicates the important and effective role of these standards in reducing information asymmetry and reducing agency costs, and international financial reporting standards It moderates the relationship between information asymmetry and agency costs. In other words, the implementation of international financial reporting standards due to additional disclosure requirements, specific measurement and recognition rules, directly affects information asymmetry, improves the quality of financial reporting and reduces agency costs and conflicts of interest. Also, the results indicated that financial helplessness increases agency cost and financial helplessness intensifies the intensity of the positive relationship between information asymmetry and agency cost. In other words, in a situation where there is simultaneous information asymmetry and financial helplessness in a company, the intensity of agency costs increases, which is the foundation of agency theory and managers' opportunism.