The results showed that there was a negative and significant relationship between management ability and stock price concurrency, and a positive and significant relationship was observed between ambiguity in financial reporting and stock price concurrency. Also, institutional ownership intensifies the intensity of the negative relationship between management ability and stock price synchronicity, and moderates and reduces the intensity of the positive relationship between ambiguity in financial reporting and stock price synchronicity. In other words, capable managers try to gain commercial credit in order to advance the investment and operational projects of the company by maintaining more cash inside the company for a long period of time. Therefore, by using different mechanisms, they have tried to reduce the information ambiguity in the company's environment in order to reduce the information asymmetry and reduce the stock price synchronicity by increasing the transparency of information by citing the signaling theory. In addition to this ambiguity, financial reporting prevents the proper functioning of corporate governance systems in overcoming information asymmetry and agency costs, and causes stock prices to reflect industry and market information more and company-specific information less and have more synchronicity. Also, with the increase in the amount of institutional ownership, considering the controlling and monitoring role that these shareholders have in the companies, the behavior of the managers under the control of these shareholders will be profitable and as a result, the managers will take steps in line with the rights of these shareholders who want to increase the value of the company. . These factors increase the information content of the stock price and more information is included in the company's stock price, which will result in a decrease in the stock price concurrency.