The ownership structure as part of the corporate governance mechanisms that reflects the owners' relationships and ownership framework influences the management and the attitude of managers. In recent financial scandals such as Adelphia and Enron in the United States and Parmalat in Europe, the transactions of affiliates have become one of the focus of concern, so that the targeted use of these transactions has been a factor in the collapse of companies. The question is, does the ownership structure moderate the relationship between transactions with affiliates and earnings management? To investigate this issue, 118 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange between 2015 and 2017 were studied and analyzed using linear regression. The test results showed that transactions with affiliates and earnings management have a significant relationship. Other test results also show that the ownership structure modulates the relationship between transactions with affiliates and earnings management.
ghorbani esfahlan,V. (2021). The role of ownership structure on the relationship between transactions with affiliates and profit management. Journal of Accounting and Management Vision, 4(42), 115-134.
MLA
ghorbani esfahlan,V. . "The role of ownership structure on the relationship between transactions with affiliates and profit management", Journal of Accounting and Management Vision, 4, 42, 2021, 115-134.
HARVARD
ghorbani esfahlan V. (2021). 'The role of ownership structure on the relationship between transactions with affiliates and profit management', Journal of Accounting and Management Vision, 4(42), pp. 115-134.
CHICAGO
V. ghorbani esfahlan, "The role of ownership structure on the relationship between transactions with affiliates and profit management," Journal of Accounting and Management Vision, 4 42 (2021): 115-134,
VANCOUVER
ghorbani esfahlan V. The role of ownership structure on the relationship between transactions with affiliates and profit management. Journal of Accounting and Management Vision, 2021; 4(42): 115-134.
